Control-flow integrity (CFI) is a general method for preventing code-reuse attacks, which utilize benign code sequences to achieve arbitrary code execution. CFI ensures that the execution of a program follows the edges of its predefined static Control-Flow Graph: any deviation that constitutes a CFI violation terminates the application. Despite decades of research effort, there are still several implementation challenges in efficiently protecting the control flow of function returns (Return-Oriented Programming attacks). The set of valid return addresses of frequently called functions can be large and thus an attacker could bend the backwardedge CFI by modifying an indirect branch target to another within the valid return set. This article proposes RAGuard, an efficient and user-transparent hardware-based approach to prevent Return-Oreiented Programming attacks. RAGuard binds a message authentication code (MAC) to each return address to protect its integrity. To guarantee the security of the MAC and reduce runtime overhead: RAGuard (1) computes the This article is an extension of the conference paper "RAGuard: A hardware based mechanism for backward-edge control-flow integrity," which appeared in the Proceedings of the International Conference on Computing Frontiers 2017 (CF'17) [61] . This submission improves the original mechanism by: (1) Raising the bar for brute-force attacks: We compute the RAMAC by encrypting the signature of the return address with AES-128 to raise the complexity of brute force attacks to 2 128 ; (2) Evaluating on a real implementation: We implement RAGuard on the open-source LEON3 processor to evaluate the runtime overhead due to AES-128 latency. Then we evaluate the performance and area overhead of RAGuard based on the Modelsim SE 10.2c simulator and Xilinx Vivado Design Suite, respectively; (3) Optimizing based on leaf functions: The RAGuard hardware dynamically identifies the leaf functions to skip unnecessary RAMAC load and store operations, thereby reducing RAGuard's performance overhead. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. MAC by encrypting the signature of a return address with AES-128, (2) develops a key management module based on a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) and a True Random Number Generator (TRNG), and (3) uses a dedicated register to reduce MACs' load and store operations of leaf functions. We have evaluated our mechanism based on the open-source LEON3 processor and the results show that RAGuard incurs acceptable performance overhead and occupies reasonable area.
RAGuard: An Efficient and User-Transparent Hardware Mechanism against ROP Attacks 50:3 • We design a backward-edge control-flow integrity mechanism RAGuard that raises attack complexity to 2 128 . RAGuard binds every return address with a message authentication code (called an RAMAC and pronounced R-A-mac) and verifies the integrity of the return address automatically. It guarantees the security of its mechanism by computing the RAMAC with AES-128 and implementing a key management module based on a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) and a True Random Number Generator (TRNG).
• We demonstrate an implementation of RAGuard on the open-source LEON3 processor, which we use to evaluate runtime overheads due to AES-128 latency. We evaluate RAGuard's performance and area overhead via the Modelsim SE 10.2c simulator and Xilinx Vivado Design Suite, respectively.
• We develop an optimization method based on leaf functions. By monitoring the call-ret instruction sequences, RAGuard dynamically identifies each leaf function and compares the return address of the leaf with the stored one. Our evaluation shows that our optimized RAGuard mechanism incurs negligible performance overhead for application with high percentage (above 70%) of leaf functions.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background introduction. Section 3 explains the threat model and the design goal. Section 4 describes our proposed RAGuard mechanism. Section 5 presents our proposed hardware solution in details and analyzes the evaluation results. Section 6 analyzes and compares related work in terms of both performance and effectiveness. Finally, Section 7 concludes this work.
BACKGROUND
Before describing RAGuard in detail, we introduce necessary background on CFI enforcement.
Stack Frames
Program stacks store information about active subroutines. As Figure 1 (a) shows, arguments are pushed onto the stack before calling a function. The actual call instruction then pushes the return address, i.e., the address of the instruction immediately following the call. The function prologue (shown in Figure 1(b) ) pushes the previous stack frame base pointer (BP) onto the stack and allocates space for the called function's local variables by adjusting the stack pointer (SP). The function arguments, return address, previous BP, and local variables comprise its stack frame. When a function returns, the function epilogue (shown in Figure 1 (c)) restores the SP and pops the return address from the stack. Finally, control flow is redirected to the return address.
The return address is stored in the stack frame during the call, which introduces a vulnerability: Attackers can redirect control flow by overwriting this original return address. For an example, attackers can exploit a buffer overflow vulnerability to overwrite the return address and thus hijack control flow.
ROP Attacks
Backward-edge CFI is a general defense against return-oriented programming (ROP) code reuse attacks [16] . ROP attacks hijack control flow by using gadgets (code segments ending with a ret instruction [45] ). Figure 2 shows an example in which the adversary initially locates the payload (a number of return addresses and necessary data in the red dotted box) in the application's stack or heap (Step 1). The adversary launches an ROP attack by leveraging buffer overflow or useafter-free vulnerabilities to overwrite the return address A (Step 2) [53] . The control flow is then hijacked, i.w., it is illegally transferred to gadget 1 (Step 3). This gadget 1 changes the stack pointer (%esp in x86 architectures) to the beginning of the payload (Step 4) and redirects the control flow to the next gadget by executing a ret instruction (Step 5). These gadgets are then executed one by one until the system is compromised.
Control-Flow Integrity
Abadi et al. [1] introduced CFI by instrumenting software with runtime label checks. Figure 3 shows an example of CFI. There are two kinds of control-flow transitions in this example. The first is the function pointer foo_ptr, which holds the address function foo. The second is the function return of foo. The former is an example of forward-edge control flow and the latter is backward-edge control flow. To protect the forward-edge control flow, CFI inserts a label (e.g., the prefetchnta instruction in Figure 3 ) before the function entry and a check before the indirect function call instruction. Backward-edge control flow integrity is generally implemented via a protected shadow stack that ensures that each ret instruction returns only to its call site [1, 6] .
Such software-based instrumentation with shadow stacks introduces high-performance overheads [1, 13] . Researchers proposed coarse-grained CFI approaches to alleviate this problem [60, 62] . These coarse-grained CFI approaches, such as avoiding shadow stacks, have better performance [6] , but they are not secure enough to thwart some recent attacks [6, 7, 9] . Thus, recent research focuses on implementing fine-grained CFI [25, 52, 54] . Tice et al. [54] enforce fine-grained forward-edge control-flow integrity in GCC and LLVM. The compiler inserts a check before every call to verify that the destination is within a jump table recording the valid targets for indirect calls [20] . For the state-of-the-art CFI mechanisms, the average runtime overhead is 4.0% for forward-edge control-flow integrity [54] and 9.7% for backward-edge control-flow integrity [13] .
Hardware-based CFI approaches [5, 8, 16, 17, 52] incur lower performance overheads than software approaches. Intel now provides an interface to its hardware solutions via an augmented Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) [10] . Budiu et al. [5] introduce new CFI instructions and a CFI label register to enforce label checks on indirect branches. Since a subroutine could be called by different routines, the compiler inserts the same label at each possible call site. This allows the attacker to bend the backward-edge control-flow [6] . Davi et al. [16, 17] address this problem by decoupling source and destination labels and enforcing CFI based on label status. Specifically, they allocate a different label to every function. When a function is called, its label is activated. They enforce backward-edge CFI by restricting each ret instruction to be to an active function.
THREAT MODEL AND DESIGN GOALS
Here, we focus primarily on ROP attacks by remote adversaries against user-space applications We assume that forward-edge CFI has been efficiently enforced by previous solutions and that an adversary can exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities to launch ROP attacks. We assume that adversaries have no control over the operating system kernel, which ensures that its services, such as Data Execution Prevention (DEP) and Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), cannot be subverted. The DEP mechanism prevents adversaries from modifying code regions or mapping data regions as executable. The ASLR mechanism ensures that stack space is randomly allocated. We assume the loaded program is benign but may contain memory safety errors. Adversaries could conduct side-channel attacks to get the application memory layout, and they could leverage the memory errors to read arbitrary application code. This would give them full control over the program's stack and heap. For example, adversaries may keep forking malicious processes to collect the return addresses and their corresponding RAMACs.
To overcome the shortcomings of previous mechanisms, RAGuard needs the following properties.
• P1 Security: The RAMAC computation and verification should be completely isolated from software, and the encryption key should never leave the chip.
• P2 User-transparency: Developers should not need to design programs differently to make use of RAGuard.
• P3 Low cost: RAGuard should cause no substantial increase in chip area or manufacturing complexity.
RAGUARD MECHANISM
Our RAGuard mechanism guarantees backward-edge CFI by verifying the integrity of return addresses. Figure 4 shows the traditional versus RAGuard stack layouts. RAGuard binds an RAMAC to each stored return address. The RAMAC is computed automatically and solely by hardware, without any support from the OS. When a function is called, an RAMAC is stored directly on the program stack with the corresponding return address. When the function returns, the RAMAC of the return address is loaded from the program stack and verified (property P1). RAGuard has the following advantages over shadow stacks. Shadow stacks track called functions as raw data, and thus they must be stored in protected or dedicated memory regions to prevent information leakage attacks. The OS must save and restore each process's shadow stack contents during context switches and must handle stack overflow. In contrast, RAGuard guarantees the integrity of a return address by checking its RAMAC. Since the (encrypted) RAMACs are treated as normal local variables, RAGuard is much more flexible and secure than a shadow stack.
Informally, a MAC consists of three algorithms: a key generation algorithm, a signing algorithm, and a verifying algorithm. Realizing the benefits of RAGuard requires answering the following questions. (i) How do we generate a key such that the key management is completely isolated from software (Section 4.1)? (ii) How do we compute an RAMAC such that it can be used to verify the integrity of return addresses (Section 4.2)? (iii) How do we modify the processor architecture to support the signing and verifying algorithms (Section 4.3)? (iv) How do we implement RAGuard with acceptable performance overheads (Section 4.4)?
Key Management Based on a PUF and a TRNG
An RAGuard key should be generated when the process is forked. To completely isolate key management from software, a key should never leave the hardware to be read by software. However, it is challenging to generate the key when the process is scheduled to run again. The properties of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs)-reliability, uniqueness, and unclonability [4, 24] -make them appealing for RAGuard key management. Reliability comes from the fact that a PUF consistently generates the same response to a given challenge. 2 This property guarantees that the same key is recovered when the process is scheduled to run again. Uniqueness means that the key from different PUFs (i.e., chips) are never the same. As PUFs exploit the uncontrollable variations in the fabrication process, they are practically impossible to duplicate.
The PUF is used to generate the encryption key when a process is newly forked or rescheduled to run (property P1). Long response latency increases the cost of context switching. 3 Thus, the response time of the PUF is critical to our RAGuard mechanism. The cost of a process switch varies significantly among processors and operating systems [14] , but it usually takes about 1-200ms [36, 63] . Table 1 The response latency and area overhead are evaluated within a 45nm technology. 2 For a 256-column by 256-row SRAM with a 5ns cycle time, the response latency is 512 write memory operations and 1 memory read operation (2.6µs) [28] . 3 Bitline PUF's area overhead amounts to a single flip-flop and two logic gates (eight Gate Equivalents (GE)) per row of SRAM. The area overhead is estimated based on a 256×256 SRAM array. 4 MECCA PUF's area overhead is a programmable delay generator whose area is estimated based on four duty cycles. 5 LR-PUF is run with an 80-bit challenge line and 64-bit response line. 6 VIA PUF requires dedicated reading circuits. overhead. However, err-PUF [58] , Bitline PUF [28] , and MECCA PUF [33] must modify the memory control logic. In contrast, LR-PUF [32] and VIA-PUF [30] can be integrated into the system as IP (intellectual property) cores. We prefer the latter option, as it adds almost no area overhead and can be implemented without bit error [30] (property P3). RAGuard's current key-management implementation uses the process ID (PID) as the process characteristic for the PUF challenge. If the PUF response is used directly as the key for the current process, then attackers may fork a large number of processes to collect return addresses and their corresponding RAMACs for later use. An attacker may perform replay attacks on a process with the anticipated PID by replacing the return address at location x with a collected return address at the same location. We deploy two mechanisms to prevent replay attacks. First, stack space is randomly allocated at runtime. This makes it more difficult for the attacker to replace the return address with a collected return address. The relationship between PID and the encryption key is configured during the power-up process. As shown in Figure 5 , we use a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) [50, 56] to generate the initial value (int_val) during power-up. int_val is valid throughout the runtime. When a process is launched or scheduled to run, its PID is used for the PUF challenge. The key for the current process (p_key) is generated by XORing the PUF response (p_key') with the initial value. van der Leest et al. implement a TRNG based on an SRAM [56] , which is available in most Integrated Circuits (ICs). Thus, a TRNG could be implemented with almost no area overhead (property P3). In 64-bit architectures, the maximum PID number is 0 × 400,000 (4, 194, 303) [14] , which can be represented in 22 bits. The inputs and outputs of the PUF Table 2 . Open Projects of Pipelined AES Implementations Project # LUTs # BRAMs Latency Muehlberghuber [40] 8,319 -12 cycles Hsing [29] 1,686 59 21 cycles Das [15] 3,314 38 32 cycles Strömbergson [51] 3,155 -46 cycles module are 32 and 128 bits, respectively. Since the input width is larger than that of PIDs, we can include more process-specific information in the future.
RAMAC Computation
To verify the integrity of a return address, the RAMAC should define the signature (or context) of the return address. As claimed in CCFI [39] , this signature contains the the return address (RA) itself and the stack pointer (SP). The former is the key information that the MAC verifies. The latter gives the position of the return address in the program stack. Including the SP in the signature ensures that an attacker cannot swap return addresses by simply copying a return address along with its MAC (property P1). First, we derive the signature (SIG) of the return address,
where || denotes concatenation. The RAMAC is computed as the hash value of SIG,
where HASH K is a hardware cryptographic hash function (property P1). The AES-CMAC [47] authentication algorithm is based on a Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) with AES-128 [41] and is used to implement the cryptographic hash function. As the key generated by PUF corresponds to the PID, attackers cannot swap a return address of one process with one of another. In 32-bit architectures, the signatures are 64 bits. The length of the signatures is less than the block length (128 bits) of AES-128. We pad the signatures with a bit string to bring length up to the block length [47] . Here, the bit string is a single "1" followed by 63 "0"s. In 64-bit architectures, the signature length equals the block length, and there is no need for adjustment. Since the RAMAC is stored on the program stack along with the return address, its width should be the same as the return address (64 bits in 32-bit systems), which gives us
Likewise, 128-bit RAMACs are represented as
AES can be implemented in software or hardware, with the latter providing more physical security and higher speed. AES architectural designs are driven by system requirements in terms of latency, resources, and frequency. Table 2 lists four open-source pipelined AES implementations. The results shown are from implementations on a Xilinx Artix-7 XC7A100T-csg324-1 FPGA device. We choose these open-source projects to study the impact of AES latency on our hardware mechanism. 4 We discuss their impact on performance in Section 5.2. 
Baseline Design
RAGuard introduces two dedicated registers-ramac_c and ramac_v 5 -and extends the semantics of the call and the ret instructions to perform the RAMAC computation and verification, respectively. Figure 6 shows how RAGuard extends the semantics of the original call and ret instructions such that these two instructions access ramac_c and ramac_v implicitly.
call: In addition to pushing the return address on the stack and transferring control to the target function, RAGuard computes the RAMAC of the return address and stores it in ramac_c. Then the computed value is pushed on the stack next to the return address.
ret: In addition to popping the return address off the stack and adjusting %esp, RAGuard loads the RAMAC from the stack into ramac_v. RAGuard recomputes the RAMAC for the popped return address and compares it with the oldest one in ramac_v. A mismatch indicates that either the popped return address or the RAMAC was modified by attackers, and RAGuard raises an exception.
These new registers are invisible to software. As parts of the atomic operation of the call and the ret instructions, they introduce no OS modification and only marginal hardware cost. Thus, our RAGuard mechanism is transparent to program developers (property P2). However, pushing the RAMAC on the program stack breaks the relative positions of the frame pointer and parameters. RAGuard therefore needs a compiler patch to allocate address space appropriately.
Optimization Based on Leaf Functions
We next analyze the impact of our RAGuard mechanism on different execution sequences of function calls. We identify several opportunities to avoid unnecessary RAMAC store and load operations.
As shown in Figure 7 (a), function sort2() calls function sort(), then function sort() calls function lt(). Functions like lt(), which does not make further calls, are called leaf functions [2] . The number "1" represents the return address of function sort(), the number "2" represents the return address of function lt(). For RAGuard, the RAMAC operations corresponding to the call and ret instructions are shown in Figure 7(b) . When a call instruction is detected, RAGuard computes the RAMAC of the return address (C-1 and C-2) and stores the RAMAC on the stack (S-1 and S-2). When a ret instruction is detected, RAGuard loads the RAMAC of return address from the stack (L-1 and L-2) and verifies the integrity of the return address (V-1 and V-2). The RAMAC of return address "2" is stored on the stack (S-2) and then loaded from the stack (L-2) sequentially. In this situation, we could save the return address of the leaf-function call on the chip and verify its integrity by comparing it with the saved return address directly. Consequently, the RAMAC store (S-2) and load (L-2) for can be avoided. We thus introduce a dedicated register that is invisible to software to save the latest return address.
A similar optimization based on leaf functions has been reported in CCFI [39] , which relies on the compiler to statically identify leaf functions. However, the hardware pipeline cannot identify a leaf function when it is called, and the RAMAC may not be fully generated when the call instruction completes. To deal with these challenges, we defer storing the RAMACs until functions are verified to be non-leaf functions. As shown in Figure 7 (c), a function is not a leaf function if there is no ret executed in between its corresponding call and the immediate following call. The RAMAC of such a non-leaf function is stored on the stack when this following call is executed.
To determine the likely impact of these optimizations, we extract the leaf function calls of the C and C++ benchmarks from SPEC CPU2006 [49] . We instrument the function entry and exit points [64] and ran the benchmarks on an Intel machine to collect runtime profiling information. Table 3 shows the percentage of leaf function calls. Most of the benchmarks (12 of 19) contain up to 70% leaf calls. Leaf calls account for half of the calls in the remaining benchmarks (7 of 19). Five benchmarks have over 95% leaf calls. These results indicate that optimizing for leaf functions could save most of the RAMAC load/store operations.
Handling setjmp() and longjmp()
RAGuard correctly handles setjmp()/longjmp() functions. setjmp() stores the context information for a predefined location into a jump buffer (jmp_buf). Then longjmp() uses the saved context information to quickly return execution to the predefined location. To correctly handle these calls, we rewrite the setjmp() and longjmp() functions as shown in Figure 8 . setjmp() gets the RAMAC from the stack and saves it to the jmp_buf. When longjmp() is about to return, the RAMAC is moved from jmp_buf to the RAMAC_v register. The hardware detects the update of the RAMAC_v register and verifies the target of the jmp instruction as it does the ret instruction.
IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We implement the RAGuard mechanism on the open-source LEON3 processor [23] . We evaluate its performance and area overhead based on the Modelsim SE 10.2c simulator and the Xilinx Vivado Design Suite, respectively. Finally, we analyze the security of our RAGuard mechanism. 
Details of RAGuard
LEON3, which is distributed by the European Space Research and Technology Centre, is a synthesizable 32-bit processor compliant with the SPARC V8 architecture. It implements a single-issue instruction pipeline with seven stages, as shown in Figure 9 . We add a hardware RAMAC computation and verification module raguard to the iu3 module. The structure of raguard is illustrated inside the dashed box of Figure 9 . The raguard module contains the following components: raguard_ctrl, key_manager, AES-128, and lsuq (the load-store update queue). The added data paths are denoted by dotted blue lines. To facilitate the RAMAC computation, we also add three registers (p_inf, p_key, and ramac_c) and two FIFOs (ramac_v and sig). The raguard_ctrl module monitors instructions at the decode stage (DE), and maintains a state machine to control RAMAC computation and verification. The state machine is shown in Figure 10 .
When a process is scheduled to run, the OS process ID (PID) 6 is reset. At the same time, the value of register p_inf is automatically updated. The raguard_ctrl module sends a process encryption key update command (pkey.update) to the key_manager, and its status becomes s_puf. The key_manager module uses the new value of the p_inf register as its input, and its output is stored in the p_key register. When the process encryption key is finished updating, the key_manager sends a response (pkey.update_done) back to the raguard_ctrl module.
When a call instruction enters the decode stage, a command is sent to the AES-128 module to compute the RAMAC (call.mac_generate), and the status of the raguard_ctrl module becomes s_aes. After receiving this command, the AES-128 module uses the signature of the return address as its input to compute the RAMAC (Equations (1-4) ). When the RAMAC is ready, the raguard_ctrl module sends the RAMAC (call.mac_store) to the lsuq (load store update queue) module. Then the call instruction is executed (call.mac_submit).
When a ret instruction enters the decode stage, the raguard_ctrl module sends a command to load the RAMAC (ret.mac_load) to the lsuq module. The RAMAC is loaded from the program stack and stored in the ramac_v FIFO. Meanwhile, the ret instruction pops the return address from the program stack in the exception stage. The raguard_ctrl module then stores the signature of the loaded return address into the sig FIFO (ret.sig_store). When the AES-128 module is free and the sig FIFO is not empty, the raguard_ctrl module sends an RAMAC calculation command (ret.mac_generate) to the AES-128 module (ret.mac_generate). After receiving the RAMAC calculation command, AES-128 recomputes the RAMAC of that return address and compares it to the oldest one in the ramac_v FIFO (ret.mac_verify). If there is a mismatch, then an exception is raised, and execution is transferred to the exception handler.
Although our proof of concept RAGuard implementation uses a single-issue processor, RAGuard can be naturally applied to superscalar and simultaneous multithreading (SMT) processors. For superscalar processors, only one process is active at a time. The mac_generate commands (call.mac_generate and ret.mac_generate) from different pipelines use the same encryption key. We can implement the RAGuard mechanism in a similar way to the LEON3. The raguard module can be shared between the pipelines directly. For SMT processors, more than one process run on the processor core at a time. The mac_generate commands from different hardware threads use different encryption keys. The AES-128 cannot process mac_generate commands from different processes at the same time. The raguard_ctrl module may employ a round-robin scheduler to assign time slices of AES-128 to the hardware threads. More than one AES-128 module may be used to accelerate RAMAC computation.
Runtime Overhead
The percentages of leaf functions and the call frequencies per 1K instructions in our benchmarks are illustrated in Figure 11 . Table 4 gives the details of the experimental setup. To evaluate RAGuard's performance overhead, workloads are loaded to the DRAM. The entry point is 0x4000_0000 and the stack pointer is set to 0x47FF_FFFF. Since we did not modify the compiler, the RAMACs are stored at shadow locations to guarantee the correct execution. In other words, the RAMACs are stored in a separate location in DRAM, instead of on the stack as Figure 4 shows. For example, if the return address is 0x47FF_FE04, the RAMAC is stored at 0x45FF_FE04 during 50:14 J. Zhang et al. evaluation. Meanwhile, to analyze the effect of AES latency on performance, we integrate the four AES implementations (shown in Table 2 ) into our projects. Figure 12 shows the runtime overhead normalized to the baseline, i.e., the original LEON3 processor from Cobham Gaisler [23] . The RAGuard case represents the design described in Section 4.3, and the optimized case represents the RAGuard design with leaf-function optimization described in Section 4.4. The numbers on the x axis denote the latencies of the AES implementations in Table 2 . As expected, our optimization mechanism efficiently reduces RAGuard's runtime overhead. For the AES with a latency of 12 cycles, RAGuard incurs 8.3% performance overhead, on average. Its worst-case degradation is 24.3% for Dhrystone. The optimized RAGuard incurs almost no performance degradation except for bitcount, which has a much lower percentage (49.9%) of leaf function calls than the other benchmarks.
The relatively large degradations for the basic (unoptimized) RAGuard are not surprising. Since we extend the semantics of the call and ret instructions to insert the RAMAC operations, there is more contention on the bus, causing extra pipeline stalls. For LEON3, the delay consists of three parts: D-cache hold time (H Dcache ), I-cache hold time (H Icache ), and RAMAC hold time (H RAMAC ). When D-cache, I-cache, and raguard_ctrl cannot submit their command immediately, they stall the pipeline. Table 5 shows the increases in the number of cycles spent in each type. The I-cache hold time is increased little by our hardware mechanism, but it substantially increases the D-cache hold time, especially for bitcount and Dhrystone. It is notable that the the RAMAC hold time is much smaller than the extra D-cache hold time. That means the RAMAC computation and verification degrade performance very little when the AES latency is small. Thus, the large drop in performance for basic RAGuard is due to the sharply increased D-cache hold time. In contrast, the optimized RAGuard sharply decreases the extra D-cache hold time, except for bitcount. This shows that our optimization can effectively reduce the performance overheads for applications with many leaf function calls. The sharply increased D-cache hold time for the unoptimized RAGuard is due to the high Dcache miss rate. As shown in Figure 13 , the D-cache misses per thousand instructions (MPKI) increases substantially, especially for Dhrystone. This is corroborated by Figure 11(b) , where Dhrystone has the highest call frequency. The increased misses may be due to our not storing the RAMAC with the corresponding return address on the program stack for these experiments If we were to modify the compiler to store the RAMAC directly with the corresponding return address, then performance will be further improved. As our optimization mechanism saves most of the load/store operations, the optimized RAGuard shows similar MPKI values to those of the original LEON3 processor. The only exception is bitcount, which has 49.9% leaf-function calls.
The long latency of the AES used in RAGuard slightly increases the performance overhead. As shown in Figure 12 , the average performance degradation of RAGuard increases from 8.2% to 10.1% when the AES latency increases from 12 to 46 cycles. The average performance degradation of the optimized RAGuard increases from 1.9% to 2.6% when the AES latency increases from 12 cycles to 46 cycles. The optimized RAGuard incurs negligible performance overhead for application with higher percentage (above 70%) of leaf functions.
Resource Overhead
We synthesize and implement our RAGuard prototype with Xilinx Vivado HLx 2016.2 [57] . The required FPGA resources are shown in Table 6 . The second row shows the resources used by the unmodified LEON3 processor. The extra resources needed by our RAGuard mechanism comprise three parts: raguard_ctrl, AES-128, 7 and key_manager (or PUF). The resource overheads of the former two are shown in the third and fourth rows, respectively, and the resource overhead of the PUF is estimated in 
Security Analysis
We restrict our discussion to attacks that leverage backward control-flow edges, such as ROP attacks. Note that RAGuard security also relies on the complexity of the RAMAC computation. In ROP attacks, the adversary overwrites return addresses on the stack and locates payloads in the application's heap/stack (as shown in Figure 2 ). Malicious return addresses in the payload may redirect control flow to arbitrary locations, unintended call sites, or even valid potential call sites within the CFG [6] . In the first case, attackers must compute the RAMACs for their dummy return addresses. In the latter two cases, attackers might carry out splicing attacks by constructing payloads with the existing return address and the corresponding RAMAC. This approach violates our RAMAC verification, as well: if a return address and its corresponding RAMAC are inserted into another location, the stack pointer of the new location disagrees with the RAMAC. Hence, attackers must also recompute the RAMACs for their malicious return addresses.
As noted in Section 4.2, the RAMAC is computed with AES-128, which encrypts the signature of the return address. A PUF module dynamically updates the encryption key on context switches. Since the encryption key never leaves the hardware and the p_key register is only accessed by hardware, adversaries cannot obtain the encryption key to produce a valid RAMAC. Moreover, the p_key register is updated at runtime, which makes the RAMAC less vulnerable to brute-force attacks.
Attackers may fork a large number of processes to collect return address and RAMAC pairs for a specific PID. When the PID is reused, the attackers could conduct replay attacks by replacing the return address at location x with a collected return addresses at the same location.
RELATED WORK

Using Shadow Stacks
Shadow stacks are considered to be an essential mechanism for the security of CFI [1, 6, 10] . They usually work by keeping a copy of the return address when a function is called. When the function returns, it uses the return address stored on the shadow stack to ensure integrity. Although shadow stacks enforce strong backward-edge CFI policy, they present several implementation challenges. First, the effectiveness of the shadow stack relies on its integrity. The shadow stack must be isolated against the software it protects. Information hiding is often used to secure software shadow stacks [13, 34, 38] with acceptable performance overhead. Unfortunately, these shadow stacks are vulnerable to information leakage attacks [9, 21, 42] . Hardware-assisted shadow stacks [22, 35, 43] copy the return addresses into a dedicated memory region. Intel recently introduced ControlFlow Enforcement Technology (CET) [10] , in which hardware-based shadow stacks verify return addresses. Furthermore, CET provides indirect branch tracking to validate forward CFI edges. Such indirect branch tracking complements our RAGuard mechanism. Both mechanisms rely on the OS to save and restore the contents of shadow stack on context switches and stack overflows [22, 43, 59] .
The use of setjmp()/longjmp() violates call and ret matching. setjmp() saves the current execution environment into a platform-specific data structure (jmp_buf). Then longjmp() restores that saved program state to continue execution after the setjmp(), allowing functions to unwind multiple stack frames. To deal with this corner case, StackGhost [22] walks back through the program's stack to find the corresponding setjmp() and manipulates the shadow stack accordingly. Smashguard [43] pops return addresses off the shadow stack until a match is found or the shadow stack is empty. Davi et al. [16, 17] design a hardware shadow stack variant that allocates a different label to every function. When a function is called, its label is activated. They enforce backwardedge CFI by restricting each ret instruction to return to an active function. Their approach tracks called functions by their label status instead of the first-in, last-out principle. In doing this, they avoid having to do anything special to correctly handle mismatches between calls and rets.
In contrast to these prior efforts, RAGuard uses RAMACs to verify the integrity of return addresses, rather than tracking the return addresses precisely using a shadow stack. While these prior efforts require dedicated memory and require that the OS handle process context switches and stack overflows, RAGuard relies on cryptography to verify the integrity of return addresses. RAGuard can also correctly handle mismatches between call and ret instructions by rewriting the setjmp() and longjmp() functions (as shown in Figure 8 ).
Using a Reversible Transform of the Return Address
A reversible transform can be used to prevent attackers from overwriting the stored return address with a legal value. When the return address needs to be stored, a reversible transform is applied to it and the result is stored on the stack instead. When the return address is popped from the stack, the reverse transform is applied to it before it is used. If attackers do not know the transform or the key to the transform, then they cannot overwrite the return address with their intended value.
StackGhost [22] applies XOR encryption to the return address value. As this approach is proposed based on the SPARC architecture, the transform is used whenever a register window overflow or underflow occurs. Similarly, PointGuard [11] XORs a key with every pointer that is loaded from or stored to memory. Unfortunately, both of approaches are susceptible to information leakage attacks. The XOR key can be inferred if attackers can read the transformed return address off the stack.
To prevent information leakage attacks, Tuck et al. [55] protect the return address with cryptography implemented in hardware. When the return address is loaded back, it is decrypted with the inverse function before being used. However, this approach is susceptible to ROP attacks. Attackers may swap a return address stored in one memory address with a pointer stored in a different memory address.
Using MACs with Return Addresses
To prevent attacks from swapping one return address with another, a message authentication code (MAC) can be bound to the return address. StackGuard [12] is the first work to employ this approach. It places a predefined secure value on the program stack next to a return address. The secure value could be a string terminator or a randomly generated number. When a function returns, the secure value is verified by the function epilogue to make sure it has remained intact. However, applying StackGuard directly to enforce backward-edge CFI does not work for two reasons. First, attackers could overwrite the secure value and the address of StackGuard's (software) security handler [37] . We therefore suggest generating and verifying the secure value automatically in hardware. Second, the secure value contains nothing about the return address, and attackers can obtain it via brute force attacks [3] .
Cryptographic CFI (CCFI) [39] uses MACs instead of a predefined secure value to efficiently provide CFI protection. CCFI's MACs are implemented as a single block of AES applied to the signature of the pointer. Because CCFI randomly generates the AES key at program initiation, it also needs the OS to save and restore the MAC key during context switches. CCFI incurs non-negligible performance overheads, even though it takes advantage of cryptographic CPU instructions (AES.NI). In contrast, RAGuard uses a novel key management method based on PUFs to isolate key management from software, and it improves the performance of backward-edge CFI with a hardware AES-128 function. Furthermore, CCFI relies on the compiler to statically identify leaf functions to reduce the cost of protecting return addresses. Instead, RAGuard proposes a dynamic hardware-based approach to avoid unnecessary store and load operations.
CONCLUSIONS
This work presents RAGuard, an efficient, user-transparent hardware mechanism for backwardedge Control Flow Integrity. RAGuard binds each return address with an RAMAC to guarantee its integrity on the program stack. Since the security of the RAMAC is guaranteed by a PUF module and a hardware cryptographic hash function, the RAMAC can be stored directly on the program stack. By dynamically avoiding storing the RAMAC for leaf functions, our optimized RAGuard incurs negligible performance overheads for application with higher percentages (above 70%) of leaf function calls. If the RAMAC is stored directly with the corresponding return address, then performance will be further improved, including for applications with few leaf function calls.
